Does a proper respect for science require psychologists to view man as an impotent reactor whose responses are completely determined by his physical constitution and the forces impinging upon him? In this wise and well-argued book, Isidor Chein invites his readers to lift their eyes from experimental research for a time to consider the relationship between science and the image of man. Few psychologists, even the most gifted and dedicated among them, pause to consider the philosophical underpinnings of their work. It is almost as though the humanist secretly lurking in each of them is fearful of the bad news he might finally be forced to accept--that man is essentially an exquisitely complicated robot. This fear is misplaced and harmful. It is largely responsible for the disturbing fact that scientific psychology has produced, in Chein's estimate, so little that is relevant to the humanities, so little, as he puts it, "that has lived up to psychology's promise to itself." What must be more widely understood is that it does not follow that behavioral law is reducible to physiological law, or that physiological law is reducible to physical law. With an uncompromising commitment to scientific method, Chein shows that, when closely analyzed, there is actually no need to assume an unbridgeable gap between scientific psychology and psychoanalytic, humanistic psychology. This is a lucid and powerful theoretical work of importance for scholars in all fields sharing the belief that the proper study of mankind is man. "The Science of Behavior and the Image of Man is written by the most intellectually stimulating and respected representative of scientific humanistic psychology."--Robert B. Holt, Professor of Psychology, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, New York University

Among the enormous oeuvre of Clausewitz the best-known work, by far, is the unfinished magnum opus On War. His works include many excellent writings on military history, of which The Campaign of 1812 in Russia is, assuredly, the masterpiece. This book is a superb first-hand account and analysis of the military disaster of 1812 and the characters who played a significant role in it. An eyewitness and participant in the war, Clausewitz' writing remains the most serious source on that campaign. Napoleon's campaign of 1812 against Russia was a crucial event in the Napoleonic history. At the beginning of 1812, Napoleon was at the peak of his glory. On the eve of the Russian campaign the majority of European diplomats thought that Napoleon would emerge victorious. The campaign, however, proved to be disastrous for the French Grand Arme. The Battle of Borodino, with heavy causalities on both sides, was probably the hardest fought battle of the Napoleonic era. Victory at Borodino gained Napoleon entry to Moscow only to end in catastrophe and the retreat of the French army in fall of the same year. The campaign of 1812 against Russia marked the beginning of the end of Napoleon's rule in Europe.Clausewitz is more than a military historian in the traditional sense. His concrete and objective analysis enables him to appreciate the situation in all its political, diplomatic and military ramifications. The Russian Campaign of 1812 will be of interest to historians, political scientists, and students of military history and strategy.

Does a proper respect for science require psychologists to view man as an impotent reactor whose responses are completely determined by his physical constitution and the forces impinging upon him? In this wise and well-argued book, Isidor Chein invites his readers to lift their eyes from experimental research for a time to consider the relationship between science and the image of man.

Few psychologists, even the most gifted and dedicated among them, pause to consider the philosophical underpinnings of their work. It is almost as though the humanist secretly lurking in each of them is fearful of the bad news he might finally be forced to accept--that man is essentially an exquisitely complicated robot. This fear is misplaced and harmful. It is largely responsible for the disturbing fact that scientific psychology has produced, in Chein's estimate, so little that is relevant to the humanities, so little, as he puts it, "that has lived up to psychology's promise to itself."

What must be more widely understood is that it does not follow that behavioral law is reducible to physiological law, or that physiological law is reducible to physical law. With an uncompromising commitment to scientific method, Chein shows that, when closely analyzed, there is actually no need to assume an unbridgeable gap between scientific psychology and psychoanalytic, humanistic psychology. This is a lucid and powerful theoretical work of importance for scholars in all fields sharing the belief that the proper study of mankind is man.

"The Science of Behavior and the Image of Man "is written by the most intellectually stimulating and respected representative of scientific humanistic psychology.""--Robert B. Holt, Professor of Psychology, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, "New York University"

"Isidor Chein" was professor of psychology at the Research Center for Human Relations, New York University. He is the author of "The Road to H, The Reactions of Jewish Boys to Various Aspects of Being Jewish," and "The Family of the Addict."

Among the enormous oeuvre of Clausewitz the best-known work, by far, is the unfinished magnum opus "On War." His works include many excellent writings on military history, of which "The Campaign of 1812 in Russia" is, assuredly, the masterpiece. This book is a superb first-hand account and analysis of the military disaster of 1812 and the characters who played a significant role in it. An eyewitness and participant in the war, Clausewitz' writing remains the most serious source on that campaign. Napoleon's campaign of 1812 against Russia was a crucial event in the Napoleonic history. At the beginning of 1812, Napoleon was at the peak of his glory. On the eve of the Russian campaign the majority of European diplomats thought that Napoleon would emerge victorious. The campaign, however, proved to be disastrous for the French Grand Arme. The Battle of Borodino, with heavy causalities on both sides, was probably the hardest fought battle of the Napoleonic era. Victory at Borodino gained Napoleon entry to Moscow only to end in catastrophe and the retreat of the French army in fall of the same year. The campaign of 1812 against Russia marked the beginning of the end of Napoleon's rule in Europe. Clausewitz is more than a military historian in the traditional sense. His concrete and objective analysis enables him to appreciate the situation in all its political, diplomatic and military ramifications. The Russian Campaign of 1812 will be of interest to historians, political scientists, and students of military history and strategy.

"On War" is the most significant attempt in Western history to understand war, both in its internal dynamics and as an instrument of policy. Since the work's first appearance in 1832, it has been read throughout the world, and has stimulated generations of soldiers, statesmen, and intellectuals.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) is best known for his masterpiece of military theory On War, yet that work formed only the first three of his ten-volume published writings. The others, historical analyses of the wars that roiled Europe from 1789 through 1815, informed and shaped Clausewitz's military thought, so they offer invaluable insight into his dialectical, often difficult theoretical masterwork. Among these historical works, one of the most important is Der Feldzug von 1799 in Italien und der Schweiz, which covers an important phase of the French Revolutionary Wars. The Coalition Crumbles, Napoleon Returns focuses mainly on the campaigns in Switzerland, where the cracks that finally fractured the alliance between Russia and Austria and led to the defeat of the Second Coalition first opened. Moving from strategy to battle scene to analysis, this first English translation of volume 6 of Clausewitz's collected works nimbly conveys the character of Clausewitz's writing in all its registers: the brisk, often powerful description of events as they unfolded and the critical reflections on strategic theory and its implications. The Coalition Crumbles, Napoleon Returns features Suvorov's astonishing march through the St. Gotthard Pass and major actions such as the Second Battle of Zurich and the Battle of Mannheim. The nature of the campaign highlighted the contrast between the opposing armies' different strengths and weaknesses and the problems of fighting as part of a coalition. This book will expand readers' experience and understanding of not only this critical moment in European history but also the thought and writings of the modern master of military philosophy.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) is best known for his masterpiece of military theory On War, yet that work formed only the first three of his ten-volume published writings. The others, historical analyses of the wars that roiled Europe from 1789 through 1815, informed and shaped Clausewitz's military thought, so they offer invaluable insight into his dialectical, often difficult theoretical masterwork. Among these historical works, one of the most important is Der Feldzug von 1799 in Italien und der Schweiz, which covers an important phase of the French Revolutionary Wars. Napoleon Absent, Coalition Ascendant covers the period of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and focuses on the Second Coalition's campaign in Italy and their victories under Suvorov's dynamic leadership that carried the tide of battle up against the French frontier. Moving from strategy to battle scene to analysis, this first English translation of volume 5 of Clausewitz's collected works nimbly conveys the character of Clausewitz's writing in all its registers: the brisk, often powerful description of events as they unfolded and the critical reflections on strategic theory and its implications. Napoleon Absent, Coalition Ascendant includes the major battles of Trebbia and Novi and will expand readers' experience and understanding of not only this critical moment in European history but also the thought and writings of the modern master of military philosophy.

Prussian general and military philosopher Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) founded the modern basis for the systematic study of war as a field of human knowledge. This volume presents the main thoughts of Clausewitz in brief but adequate form to serve as an introduction to, and summation of, his concepts regarding the broader problems of war and conflict strategy.

The Battle of Waterloo has been studied and dissected so extensively that one might assume little more on the subject could be discovered. Now historian Peter HofschrOEer brings forward a long-repressed commentary written by Carl von Clausewitz, the author of On War.Clausewitz, the Western world's most renowned military theorist, participated in the Waterloo campaign as a senior staff officer in the Prussian army. His appraisal, offered here in an up-to-date and readable translation, criticized the Duke of Wellington's actions. Lord Liverpool sent his translation of the manuscript to Wellington, who pronounced it a "lying work." The translated commentary was quickly buried in Wellington's private papers, where it languished for a century and a half. Now published for the first time in English, HofschrOEer brings Clausewitz's critique back into view with thorough annotation and contextual explanation. Peter HofschrOEer, long recognized as a leading scholar of the Napoleonic Wars, shows how the Duke prevented the account's publication during his lifetime-a manipulation of history so successful that almost two centuries passed before Clausewitz's work reemerged, finally permitting a reappraisal of key events in the campaign. In addition to translating and annotating Clausewitz's critique, HofschrOEer also includes an order of battle and an extensive bibliography.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) is best known for his masterpiece of military theory On War, yet that work formed only the first three of ten volumes of his published writings. The others, historical analyses of the wars that roiled Europe from 1789 through 1815, informed and shaped Clausewitz's military thought, so they offer invaluable insight into his dialectical, often difficult theoretical masterwork. Among these historical works, perhaps the most important is Napoleon's 1796 Italian Campaign, which covers a crucial period in the French Revolutionary Wars. During this campaign the young, largely unknown Corsican, in his first command, led the French Army to triumph over the superior forces of the Austrian and Sardinian Armies. Moving from strategy to battle scene to analysis, this first English translation nimbly conveys the character of Clausewitz's writing in all its registers: the brisk, often powerful description of events as they unfolded; the critical reflections on strategic theory and its implications; and, most bracing, the dissection and sharp judgment of the actions of the French and Austrian commanders. From the thrill of the Battle of Montenotte-the youthful Bonaparte's first offensive-to the remorseless logic of Clausewitz's assessments, Napoleon's 1796 Italian Campaign will expand readers' experience and understanding of not only this critical moment in European history but also the thought and writings of the modern master of military philosophy.

The Battle of Waterloo has been studied and dissected so extensively that one might assume little more on the subject could be discovered. Now historian Peter Hofschroer brings forward a long-repressed commentary written by Carl von Clausewitz, the author of "On War."

Clausewitz, the Western world's most renowned military theorist, participated in the Waterloo campaign as a senior staff officer in the Prussian army. His appraisal, offered here in an up-to-date and readable translation, criticized the Duke of Wellington's actions. Lord Liverpool sent his translation of the manuscript to Wellington, who pronounced it a "lying work." The translated commentary was quickly buried in Wellington's private papers, where it languished for a century and a half. Now published for the first time in English, Hofschroer brings Clausewitz's critique back into view with thorough annotation and contextual explanation.

Peter Hofschroer, long recognized as a leading scholar of the Napoleonic Wars, shows how the Duke prevented the account's publication during his lifetime--a manipulation of history so successful that almost two centuries passed before Clausewitz's work reemerged, finally permitting a reappraisal of key events in the campaign. In addition to translating and annotating Clausewitz's critique, Hofschroer also includes an order of battle and an extensive bibliography.

Vom Kriege is a book on war and military strategy by Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), written mostly after the Napoleonic wars, between 1816 and 1830, and published posthumously by his wife in 1832. It has been translated into English several times as On War. On War is actually an unfinished work; Clausewitz had set about revising his accumulated manuscripts in 1827, but did not live to finish the task. His wife, with whom he shared a deep intellectual relationship, edited his collected works and published them between 1832 and 1835. His 10-volume collected works contain most of his larger historical and theoretical writings, though not his shorter articles and papers or his extensive correspondence with important political, military, intellectual and cultural leaders in the Prussian state. On War is formed by the first three volumes and represents his theoretical explorations. It is one of the most important treatises on political-military analysis and strategy ever written, and remains both controversial and a living influence on strategic thinking.

On War (1832) is a treatise on the philosophical aspects of warfare by Prussian general, scholar, and strategist Carl von Clausewitz. Published posthumously by the author's wife-who edited his manuscript and wrote the book's introduction-On War is one of history's most important works on warfare and military strategy, and continues to be studied to this day. With a background in art, culture, and history, and with extensive experience as a combat veteran, Clausewitz sought to understand the military success of such figures as Napoleon and Frederick the Great. What interested Clausewitz the most was how these leaders effectively mobilized entire nations to launch military campaigns larger and more violent than any in European history. Although he initially began with the theory that war was one aspect of a population's struggle for survival, he eventually came to believe that war was a method of imposing the will of one state on another. By privileging politics and philosophy in his study of warfare, Clausewitz changed the way military figures, politicians, and scholars thought of and perpetrated the process of war. Most crucially, Clausewitz suggests that war serves no purpose in and of itself, but rather acts as an instrument of a political party or group. In addition, Clausewitz believed that strong moral and political motivations-especially in the case of defense-greatly increased the chance of victory. On War was read and interpreted by Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong, and Dwight Eisenhower, and has, for over a century and a half, continued to shape the concept and conduct of war. With a beautifully designed cover and professionally typeset manuscript, this edition of Carl von Clausewitz's On War is a classic of history, philosophy, and military theory reimagined for modern readers.

On War (1832) is a treatise on the philosophical aspects of warfare by Prussian general, scholar, and strategist Carl von Clausewitz. Published posthumously by the author's wife-who edited his manuscript and wrote the book's introduction-On War is one of history's most important works on warfare and military strategy, and continues to be studied to this day. With a background in art, culture, and history, and with extensive experience as a combat veteran, Clausewitz sought to understand the military success of such figures as Napoleon and Frederick the Great. What interested Clausewitz the most was how these leaders effectively mobilized entire nations to launch military campaigns larger and more violent than any in European history. Although he initially began with the theory that war was one aspect of a population's struggle for survival, he eventually came to believe that war was a method of imposing the will of one state on another. By privileging politics and philosophy in his study of warfare, Clausewitz changed the way military figures, politicians, and scholars thought of and perpetrated the process of war. Most crucially, Clausewitz suggests that war serves no purpose in and of itself, but rather acts as an instrument of a political party or group. In addition, Clausewitz believed that strong moral and political motivations-especially in the case of defense-greatly increased the chance of victory. On War was read and interpreted by Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong, and Dwight Eisenhower, and has, for over a century and a half, continued to shape the concept and conduct of war. With a beautifully designed cover and professionally typeset manuscript, this edition of Carl von Clausewitz's On War is a classic of history, philosophy, and military theory reimagined for modern readers.

Clausewitz, who fought in the Napoleonic wars, sought to understand and analyze the phenomenon of war so that future leaders could win conflicts more effectively. This abridged edition selects the books in which the nature and theory of war are developed and explains the originality his ideas.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) is best known for his masterpiece of military theory On War, yet that work formed only the first three of ten volumes of his published writings. The others, historical analyses of the wars that roiled Europe from 1789 through 1815, informed and shaped Clausewitz's military thought, so they offer invaluable insight into his dialectical, often difficult theoretical masterwork. Among these historical works, perhaps the most important is Napoleon's 1796 Italian Campaign, which covers a crucial period in the French Revolutionary Wars. During this campaign the young, largely unknown Corsican, in his first command, led the French Army to triumph over the superior forces of the Austrian and Sardinian Armies. Moving from strategy to battle scene to analysis, this first English translation nimbly conveys the character of Clausewitz's writing in all its registers: the brisk, often powerful description of events as they unfolded; the critical reflections on strategic theory and its implications; and, most bracing, the dissection and sharp judgment of the actions of the French and Austrian commanders. From the thrill of the Battle of Montenotte-the youthful Bonaparte's first offensive-to the remorseless logic of Clausewitz's assessments, Napoleon's 1796 Italian Campaign will expand readers' experience and understanding of not only this critical moment in European history but also the thought and writings of the modern master of military philosophy.